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Abstract 
Terrorism is a phenomenon that affects many countries 
around the world, disproportionately those classified as weak 
and failing states.  It is important to understand why terrorism 
continues to occur, due to the threat it poses to the international 
community.  Once the triggers of terrorism are identified, they 
can be used to aid in the creation of counterterrorism policy to 
make it more effective and less strenuous.  In this study, I sought 
to explain what led to groups’ choice to resort to terrorism within 
weak states.  To answer this question, I used a case study 
approach, examining four terrorist groups each from India and 
Burma in order to test my hypotheses.  I hypothesized that when 
governments impose repressive policies that restrict a group 
from engaging in political privileges awarded to other citizens 
outside the group, terrorism will be more likely to occur.  I also 
hypothesized that when governments lack the capacity to enforce 
their laws, groups will be more likely to resort to terrorism.  To 
test my hypotheses, I examined the policy and capacity of the 
government just prior to the first terrorist attack conducted by 
each group.  While there was government repression in the case 
of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, it was not present prior 
to attacks by any of the other groups examined.  In terms of 
capacity, no evidence was presented that showed any 
relationship between the capacity of the state and the decision of 
groups to engage in terrorism.  Therefore, I concluded that 
neither repression nor capacity are necessary, preexisting 
conditions for terrorism to occur and do not have an effect on 
groups’ decision to engage in terrorist activity. 
 
 
10th Edition 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
Introduction 
 Terrorism is a scary word.  By one definition, terrorism 
is “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public…” (United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 15/210).  It is important to understand why 
terrorism continues to occur, due to the threat it poses to the 
international community, particularly those classified as weak or 
failing states.  
 In this paper, I ask the question of what leads to groups’ 
choice to resort to terrorism within weak states.  To begin to 
answer this question, I create two hypotheses.  I hypothesized 
that when governments impose repressive policies that restrict a 
group from engaging in political privileges awarded to other 
citizens outside the group, terrorism will be more likely to occur.  
I also hypothesize that when governments lack the capacity to 
enforce their laws, groups will be more likely to resort to 
terrorism.  Together, these hypotheses seek to explain two 
factors that help further the understanding of why groups choose 
to engage in terrorist tactics.  To test these hypotheses, I use a 
case study approach, examining four terrorist organizations each 
from India and Burma.  Within India, I examine the Communist 
Party of India – Amoist (CPI-Maoist), All Tripura Tiger Force 
(ATTF), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM).  Within Burma, I 
study the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Kachin 
Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA), and the Shan State Army – South (SSA-S).  By 
limiting my scope to these two countries and eight terrorist 
organizations, it allows me to effectively test my hypotheses as 
well as provide an in-depth look at the decision making 
undertaken by potential terrorist organizations. 
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History and Background 
It is no debate that terrorist attacks are more prevalent 
and more intense in weak and failed states.  This is indicated by 
the Global Terrorism Database’s 45 Years of Terrorism Map, 
which marks all terrorist attacks that have occurred over the past 
forty-five years.  As can be seen from the map, terrorist attacks 
are more common and more intense in weak and failed states 
(See Appendix 1).  Therefore, it makes sense to examine them in 
this study, since there is a larger variety and prevalence of 
terrorist activity within these countries.  While strong and stable 
states are not immune from terrorist activity, weak and failed 
states experience a much higher amount of terrorism.  Weak 
states are countries that continue to provide some political goods 
to citizens, mostly monopolize the use of force, and are seen as 
legitimate by the population, but are at risk of total state failure 
(Piazza 2008, 471).   
Terrorism is able to fester in weak states because, like 
failed states, they suffer from “administrative incapacity” 
meaning they cannot provide the basic services that most citizens 
expect from modern government, such as a minimal level of 
personal security, economic stability, functioning institutions, 
and political goods (Piazza 2008, 470).  While failed states suffer 
the most, weak states contain elements of failed states and 
therefore share some of the elements of administrative 
incapacity.  Because of this, terrorism thrives not only in failed 
states, but weak states as well since they have similar conditions.   
Terrorism appears to be more prominent in certain areas 
over others.  In 2017, the Global Terrorism Database published 
its background report detailing several general terrorism 
statistics.  In 2017, there were a total of 10,900 terrorist attacks 
around the world.  Of those terrorist attacks, 35% occurred in the 
Middle East and North Africa, 31% occurred in South Asia, and 
18% occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, leaving the remaining 16% 
occurring in the rest of the world (Global Terrorism Database).  
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These three regions were also responsible for the highest percentage 
of total terrorism deaths with the Middle East and North Africa 
having 41%, South Asia having 29%, and Sub-Saharan Africa 
having 25%, with the remaining 5% belonging to the rest of the 
world (Global Terrorism Database).  This does not suggest 
terrorism is limited to these three regions of the world.  Terrorism 
can occur anywhere, as we know, however what is seen is that 
terrorism is much more prominent in these three regions than other 
areas of the world. 
This is significant because these three regions also have the 
highest number of failed states.  While the Fragile States Index does 
not break it down in this way, it can easily be determined from 
looking at the map that a high number of very fragile states exist in 
the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia 
when compared to the rest of the world (See Appendix 2).  While 
no continent is free from weak states, there is a disproportionate 
number within these geographic regions.  This further strengthens 
the relationship between weak and failed states and terrorism. 
Because of this visible link, I have chosen to examine weak 
states in this study.  I have chosen India and Burma as my two states 
because one is a democracy, one is not, and both are considered 
weak states.  In order to combat the majority of terrorism, we must 
understand the reasoning behind the decision to engage in it in the 
first place.  This can best be examined in weak and failed states, 
since they have the highest number of terrorist attacks and deaths as 
can be evidenced from the relationship shown above.  Therefore, 
weak states are not to be ignored.  Rather, they must be built up, 
strengthened, and protected in order to prevent further development 
of terrorism across vulnerable parts of the world. 
 
Literature Review 
 Terrorists are often misunderstood and dismissed as 
irrational actors because of their use of unconventional methods.  
Author Bryan Caplan rejects the argument that terrorists are 
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irrational actors.  Rather, terrorists are rational actors that weigh 
the costs and benefits of their actions.  Caplan suggests the use 
of the rational choice model cannot be discarded simply because 
of a few outliers such as suicide bombers and still applies to 
terrorists as a whole (Caplan 2006, 105).  Caplan follows this up 
by saying rational choice is just a model and does not account for 
real life influences like religious beliefs and political motivations 
(Caplan 2006, 105).  Once these are incorporated, the rational 
choice model can be adapted to apply to terrorists (Caplan 2006, 
105).  Robert Pape takes this argument a step further saying 
suicide terrorists are rational actors as well since their actions are 
strategically calculated to create a desired outcome (Pape 2006). 
Martha Crenshaw also weighs in on this debate when discussing 
the psychology of terrorism.  She suggests that terrorists cannot 
be considered in isolation from their social and political context 
but must be examined based on a model that integrates the 
individual, group, and society (Crenshaw 2000, 418).  Therefore, 
it is invalid to assume terrorists are irrational actors, simply 
because they do not it a hypothetical model that was not 
designed for them anyway.  It must be presumed that terrorists 
are at least semi-rational actors. 
 Martha Crenshaw also argues that terrorism is not a 
reflection of deep cleavages in society or mass discontent, rather 
it is fueled by the way governments react to that discontent 
(Crenshaw 1981, 396).  If a government handles discontent 
poorly or inconsistently, groups are more likely to engage in 
terrorism (Crenshaw 1981, 396).  Some of the ways in which 
governments can mishandle discontent is by being unable to or 
unwilling to quell the dissatisfaction.  Crenshaw also argues that 
when the government restricts participation in the political 
process, it creates more motivation for terrorists.  When groups 
cannot have their voices heard through traditional governmental 
avenues, they will turn to other ways to have their concerns 
expressed.   
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 Smelser says that that one of the underlying causes of 
terrorism is dispossession.  He describes dispossession as 
“precipitations on the part of a group that it is systematically 
excluded, discriminated against, or disadvantages with respect to 
some meaningful aspect of social, economic, and political life to 
which it feels entitled” (Smelser 2007, 16).  He goes on to clarify 
that dispossession must be present as a necessary condition for 
dissatisfaction and collective mobilization (Smelser 2007, 16).  
Smelser argues that this dispossession has been at the root of 
many identity-based conflicts in the world linked to terrorist 
activities on behalf of the disenfranchised groups (Smelser 2007, 
21).  Perceived dispossession is usually linked to some form of 
government repression.  Therefore, governments that repress 
groups’ ability to participate in the political process or voice 
their disagreement with the government will have higher 
dispossession and as a result higher amounts of terrorist activity.   
 Abrahms rejects the strategic model argument that has 
been used to analyze the causes of terrorism.  The strategic 
model relies on three core assumptions: terrorists are motivated 
by relatively stable and consistent political preferences, terrorists 
evaluate the expected payoffs of their available options, and 
terrorism is adopted when the expected political return is 
superior to those of alternative options (Abrahms 2008, 79).  
Through a series of seven puzzles, he deconstructs the argument 
and proposes an alternative.  He examines terrorist motives using 
organization theories, since terrorist attacks are perpetrated by 
members of the organization (Abrahms 2008, 94).  Rather than 
looking at the group as a whole, Abrahms examines the members.  
He favors the natural systems model which “posits that people 
participate in organizations not to achieve their official goals, but to 
experience social solidarity with other members” (Abrahms 2008, 94-
95).  He argues that people join terrorist organizations and continue to 
fight for them, not because they are ideologically close to the cause or 
believe in the change, but because it gives them a sense of belonging 
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as a member of a group where they feel important.   
Piazza argues that minority group economic discrimination 
significantly increases the probability of domestic terrorist attacks 
(Piazza 2011, 339).  Likewise, countries lacking minority economic 
discrimination are significantly less likely to experience terrorism 
(Piazza 2011, 339).  Minority economic discrimination can involve 
employment discrimination, unequal access to healthcare, educational 
or social services, formal or informal housing segregation, or general 
lack of economic opportunities that are available to the rest of society 
(Piazza 2011, 340).  This discrimination reinforces social exclusion 
and a sense of otherness in minority group members, leaving them 
aggravated and upset with the system (Piazza 2011, 340).  Piazza 
argues this makes these groups more susceptible to radicalization and 
fertile group for terrorist movements (Piazza 2011, 340).   Piazza 
finds that overall economic status of a country has a smaller effect on 
terrorism than does the economic status of a country’s minority 
groups (Piazza 2011, 350).  Piazza concludes “countries featuring 
minority group economic discrimination are significantly more likely 
to experience domestic terrorist attacks, whereas countries lacking 
minority groups of whose minorities do not face discrimination are 
significantly less likely to experience terrorism” (Piazza 2011, 339).   
 
Hypotheses 
 In this paper, I seek to explain what leads to groups’ 
choice to engage in terrorism within weak states.  To answer this 
question, I hypothesized that two factors will influence this 
choice.  The first hypothesis is that when governments impose 
repressive policies, groups will be more likely to engage in 
terrorism.  The second hypothesis is that when governments lack 
capacity to enforce their laws, groups will be more likely to 
resort to terrorism. 
 The first hypothesis focuses on repression and the 
inability of groups to express their opposition in other ways.  To 
silence dissent, governments can make the cost of peaceful 
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protest very high, giving groups fewer options to have their 
voices heard.  As a result of this silencing by governments, 
groups may be more inclined to switch to terrorist tactics in 
order to express opposition to government action.  However, 
since terrorism carries many more risks than peaceful protest or 
dissent, it is not a simple decision to begin to engage in these 
tactics.  Terrorists, as presumably semi-rational actors, weigh the 
costs and benefits of their actions.  When groups are looking to 
respond to repressive actions by their government, they may 
begin to engage in terrorist attacks. 
 The second hypothesis brings into question the capacity 
of the state.  When states cannot enforce their laws, groups may 
be more likely to engage in terrorism.  This is simply due to the 
lack of opposition and fear of the government, since it is 
unwilling or unable to carry out its laws.  We must still assume 
terrorists are semi-rational actors.  Engaging in terrorism may 
become a more viable choice since a weak and uncapable 
government may be unable to provide much effective opposition.  
Lack of capacity also increases the likelihood of the organization 
to thrive, since the government may not have the basic ability to 
tamp down terrorist groups.  This provides an environment in 
which budding terrorist organizations can grow, making 
terrorism more likely to occur.   
 
Methodology 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I will use a case study 
approach.  I believe a case study approach is the best option 
because it will enable me to trace the process of terrorist group 
development, relationship with the government, timing of 
repression, and number of terrorist attacks.  By focusing on the 
micro-level provided by a qualitative study, I believe I will better 
be able to test my hypotheses.   
 In order to carry out the testing of my hypotheses, I will 
use a variety of different techniques.  Using the Global 
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Terrorism Database, I will examine the first terrorist attack, or 
the first terror attack conducted in ten or more years by each 
group.  I will cross reference this with the policy of the 
government, looking to see if any repressive actions have 
occurred before the initial terrorist attack was carried out.  These 
repressive actions can vary but must restrict or prevent the group 
from engaging in political privileges awarded to other citizens 
outside the group.  I will also examine the location of the attack, 
the recipient of the attack, and the state of the police force and 
military at the time.  I expect to see, if there was a terrorist 
attack, it was preceded by government repression.  I also expect 
to see that at the time of the attack, the police and military were 
either weak or preoccupied at the time.  I will be testing to see if 
these two preexisting conditions are necessary for terrorism to 
occur. 
For the purposes of this paper, I am defining terrorism as 
“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror 
in the general public…” (United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 15/210).  I am defining capacity as a combination of 
things including the ratio of police to population, the ratio of 
military personnel to population, and location of the terrorist 
attack.  These three factors illustrate the capacity of the state 
most efficiently because they illustrate the ability of each 
country to carry out its laws and policies, should it choose to do 
so.  I am defining a repressive policy as a policy implemented 
specifically to restrict or prevent a group from engaging in 
political privileges awarded to other citizens outside the group. 
Since gaining independence in 1947, India has remained 
a democratic country, allowing much political participation and 
guaranteeing basic civil rights and liberties for its citizens.  
According to the Polity IV index, India scores a +9.  This is the 
second highest democracy rating a country can achieve, meaning 
India is very democratic.  India also has a very low police-to-
population ration, with 138 police per 100,000 people (The 
10th Edition 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
Economic Times 2018).  This is grossly inadequate to support 
the needs of the population, let alone combat terrorist 
organizations.  This number was the fifth lowest of the 71 
countries for which the UN collected this data (The Economic 
Times 2018).  India has almost three million people serving in its 
military, making up approximately 0.6% of its total labor force 
(World Bank).  For such a populous country, this is a very low 
number of military personnel serving.  This illustrates that India 
is a democratic country with little capacity.   
After gaining independence in 1948, Burma fell into 
authoritarian rule.  Up until 2011, Burma has been subject to 
harsh rule by military juntas and is still considered a closed 
anocracy with a score of -3 (Polity IV Index).  Burmese citizens 
lack basic civil liberties and political freedoms, and their recently 
democratically elected government has not been upholding 
human rights.  Burma also has a low police-to-population ration, 
with one police offer for every 1,000-2,000 people (KST 2016).  
This demonstrates that the capacity of the government to enforce 
its laws is relatively limited, given the low number of police 
officers.  Burma has over five hundred thousand people serving 
in its military, making up about 2.0% of its total labor force 
(World Bank).  This number is much higher than most countries, 
the majority of which are under 1% (World Bank).  This 
indicates that Burma has a large percentage of its labor force 
serving in the military, which may in turn suggest it has a higher 
capacity. 
 
Findings 
Burma 
 Within Burma, I will be examining four terrorist 
organizations including Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 
(ARSA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National 
Liberation Army (KNLA), and the Shan State Army – South 
(SSA-S).   
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Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) 
The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) first 
emerged in 2016, though it is believed to have been training 
people since 2013 (BBC News).  ARSA predominantly operates 
in the northern Rakhine state of Burma, where the Burmese 
government has engaged in ethnic cleansing through the forceful 
removal and murder of the Rohingya people (Edroos 2017, BBC 
News) (See Appendix 3).  ARSA states its purpose is to defend, 
salvage, and protect the Rohingya people in line with the 
principle of self-defense (BBC News).  The Rohingya people 
have historically faced discrimination and multiple human rights 
violations by the Burmese government, so much so that they are 
considered illegal immigrants (despite the Rakhine state being 
their ancestral lands) and are denied citizenship (Edroos 2017, 
BBC News).  Burma is a predominantly Buddhist state and the 
majority of Rohingya are Muslim.  ARSA is considered a 
terrorist organization by the Burmese government (BBC News).  
The Burmese government also claims that ARSA is a jihadist 
organization with the goal of imposing Sharia Law on Burma 
(Edroos 2017).  ARSA has refuted this claim, saying it has no 
connection to Muslim terrorist organizations nor do its goals 
involve religious motivations (Edroos 2017).  ARSA also rejects 
the terrorist label (Edroos 2017).     
 In 1982, the Burmese government passed the Pyithu 
Hluttaw Law No. 4, also known as the Burma Citizenship Law.  
This law granted citizenship to any person belonging to the listed 
“national races” which includes the Karen, Kachin, and Shan, or 
anyone whose ancestors settled in the country before British 
occupation in 1823 (Human Rights Watch).  Many Rohingya 
people can trace their ancestry in the region prior to 1823 yet are 
denied citizenship (Human Rights Watch).  Because of this, the 
Rohingya are considered stateless persons and are not subject to 
any of the rights or privileges of citizenship within Burma 
(Human Rights Watch).  This denial of citizenship promotes the 
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view within Burma that Rohingya is a made-up, fabricated 
ethnicity (Burmese Rohingya Organization UK 2014).  
Therefore, the Rohingya are subject to racial hatred and violence 
against the community as a whole (Burmese Rohingya 
Organization UK 2014).  They are also unable to participate in 
parts of political life that are awarded to other citizens due to this 
act. 
In 2012, tensions ratcheted up between the Buddhist 
government and Muslim Rohingya groups.  The Burmese 
government had failed to propose a solution for the 800,000 
Rohingya living in the Rakhine state in destitute conditions 
resembling refugee camps (Fuller 2012). Since the Rohingya are 
considered stateless due to their lack of citizenship, they cannot 
own land, are restricted from travel, and confined to one area 
(Fuller 2012).  This action caused the Rohingya to riot, burning 
down over 500 homes (Fuller 2012).  The Burmese government 
managed to shut down the riot. 
In the subsequent years the Rohingyas continued to riot, 
demanding basic human rights.   
ARSA engaged in twenty-eight coordinated attacks on August 
25, 2017, targeting police posts along the Burmese border 
(Global Terrorism Database).  Casualties were high for both 
sides, killing 12 security personnel and 77 Rohingya fighters 
(Global Terrorism Database).  This caused the Burmese 
government to launch a massive campaign against the Rohingya 
people in the Rakhine state (BBC News).  Entire villages were 
burned to the ground and over 700,000 people were forced to 
flee their homelands in what the United Nations refers to as “a 
textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (BBC News).  As of mid-
April, 781,000 Rohingya refugees were living in nine camps and 
settlements within Bangladesh near the border of Burma (BBC 
News).  In response to the massive attacks by the government, 
ARSA tried to fight back, launching another series of attacks on 
police in early September. 
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Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) & Karen National 
Union (KNU) 
The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) was 
founded in 1947 as the military branch of the Karen National 
Union (KNU).  The KNU has the goal of establishing 
independence for the Karen ethnic group within Burma (Karen 
National Union).  This is the longest civil war in Burma, and one 
of the longest in the world beginning in 1947.  In February 1948, 
the Karen people took to the streets in Burma to demand an 
independent Karen state, claiming they never wanted to be 
incorporated into the larger nation of Burma (Ehna 2013) (See 
Appendix 3).  The Burmese government did not grant the Karen 
independence and revolts began to occur. On January 31, 1949 
the Karen National Union declared war on the Burmese 
government and the conflict has continued since.   
 Tensions reached their highest in the late 1980’s, with 
the Karen National Union (KNU) joining the pro-democracy 
movement, along with many other groups, and engaging in 
peaceful protest against the military dictatorship (Human Rights 
Watch).  The military government engaged in several repressive 
measures to shut down the opposition, causing human rights 
abuses to increase, particularly against members of the Karen 
community (Human Rights Watch).  During the 1980’s, 
terrorism carried out by KNLA increased significantly from zero 
incidents in 1985 to 14 documented terrorist attacks in 1988 
(Global Terrorism Database).  Between 1985 and 1988  the 
Karen were facing significant government discrimination, which 
peaked in 1988.  This discrimination included suppression of 
religion and use of torture and forced labor (Mirante 1987). 
Between 1988 and 1997, the KNU continued to launch 
intermittent attacks back and forth with the Burmese government 
as part of the civil war.  After a breakdown in peace negotiations 
in 1996, the government launched a new offensive against the 
KNU, attacking their guerilla camps as well as populous cities 
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(Human Rights Watch) (Minorities at Risk).  It is important to 
note that in 1996, along with the breakdown in negotiations, the 
KNU also launched four terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism 
Database).  During the offensive, the military doubled the size of 
its armed forces and established a permanent presence in 
territory held by the KNU (Human Rights Watch).  During this 
time of occupation, countless human rights abuses took place by 
the Burmese military, including deliberate attacks on civilians, 
sexual violence against women and children, attack on food 
supplies, and use of landmines (Gyaw Gyaw).  This forced 
thousands of Karen to seek refuge in Thailand due to the 
genocidal tactics used by the Burmese military (Human Rights 
Watch).  In 2005, the KNU launched four attacks and zero in 
2006 (Global Terrorism Database).  Then, government engaged 
in more crackdowns in 2007-2008, forcing more people to flee 
their homeland and seek refuge in Thailand (Pattisson 2007).  
Between 1996 and 2007, over one million Karen people were 
displaced due to the human rights violations including rape, 
forced labor, and torture (Pattisson 2007).   
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was founded in 
1961 as the military branch of the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO) with the goal to gain independence for the 
Kachin ethnic group (Myanmar Peace Monitor).  The KIA has 
agreed to many ceasefire agreements over the years, all of which 
have been broken.  Recently, the KIA has refused to join the 
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which it believes is biased 
against minority ethnic groups (Combs 2018).  The KIA operates 
predominantly in the areas along the Sino-Burmese border and is 
based in the city of Laiza (Myanmar Peace Monitor, Beech 
2014).  The KIA is considered an illegal organization by the 
Burmese government (Myanmar Peace Monitor).   
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) first engaged in 
terrorism in 1988 and continued intermittently until 1992 (Global 
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Terrorism Database).  The KIA then took a twenty-year hiatus 
before beginning to engage in terrorism once again in 2012 
(Global Terrorism Database).  In 2011, tensions between the Kia 
and the Burmese military were renewed in the northernmost part 
of Burma (Human Rights Watch).  Both sides argue the other 
was responsible for the breakdown in peace, but the conflict 
came after the KIA was ordered to withdraw from an area where 
a hydropower plant is located (BBC News 2011).  After 
seventeen years of ceasefire in the Kachin State, the Burmese 
military launched offensive operations against the KIA (Human 
Rights Watch) (See Appendix 3).  This led to a humanitarian 
crisis affecting tens of thousands of civilians, against whom the 
Burmese army is committing serious abuses (Human Rights 
Watch).  Soldiers have threatened and tortured civilians, engaged 
in sexual violence, utilized forced labor, and have conscripted 
child soldiers (Human Rights Watch).  This has caused over 
75,000 Kachin to flee their homes, seeking refuge along the 
border in China (Human Rights Watch).  In 2012, China forcibly 
returned approximately 7,000 – 10,000 Kachin refugees to 
Burma, causing an increase of internally displaced persons 
within the country (Human Rights Watch).  The KIA launched 
their first terrorist attack in almost two decades on April 28, 
2012 (Global Terrorism Database).  The KIA attacked a 
government building, killing three government officials and 
presumably kidnapping three others (Global Terrorism 
Database). 
Shan State Army – South (SSA-S) 
The Shan State Army – South (SSA-S) is the armed 
wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) 
(Myanmar Peace Monitor).  The SSA-S was formed when it 
broke away from the Shan United Revolutionary Army in 1996, 
after opposing a ceasefire made between the SURA and the 
Burmese government (Myanmar Peace Monitor).  The goal of 
the SSA-S is to create an independent Shan state for the Shan 
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ethnic group within Burma.  In recent months, the conflict 
between the SSA-S and the Burmese government has ramped up 
as the government is preoccupied with the Rohingya crisis in the 
west of the country (France Presse 2018).  SSA-S operates in the 
northern part of Burma known as the Shan state, where the 
geography is in their favor (France-Presse 2018).  The territory is 
rural and mountainous, allowing the SSA-S to thrive.  
In 2004-2005 the Burmese government launched an 
offensive against the secessionist group Shan State Army – 
South (SSA-S) (Human Rights Watch).  This, like many of the 
Burmese military’s campaigns, consisted of forcing entire 
villages to relocate and seek asylum in Thailand due to the 
torture, rape, and other violent acts against Shan civilians.  It was 
estimated that between 200-500 civilians fled the Shan state 
daily, with an estimated total of 300,000 refugees seeking safety 
in Thailand (Human Rights Watch).   
In May 2005, the SSA-S engaged in its first documented 
attack which consisted of a group of three bombings in Yangon 
resulting in the deaths of 19 people (Global Terrorism Database).  
This terrorist act occurred during the military invasion and use of 
unlawful war tactics in the Shan state (Global Terrorism 
Database).  This is the first documented terrorist attack by the 
SSA-S, however insurgency within the Shan State has been an 
ongoing struggle. 
India 
On August 18, 1958, the first version of the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act was passed by the Indian government 
(Human Rights Watch 2008).   The goal of the act was to deploy 
the army against an armed separatist movement in the Naga Hills 
(Human Rights Watch 2008).  Although the original document 
was supposed to be a short-term measure, AFSPA has been 
continuously invoked and renewed for over five decades and 
expanded to different regions in India (Human Rights Watch 
2008).  Originally, the act only extended to the northeast, 
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particularly the regions of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, and 
Tripura (Human Rights Watch 2008) (see Appendix 4).  Now, 
AFSPA has been expanded to include Jammu & Kashmir, 
Mizoram, and parts of Arunachal Pradesh (Das 2018) (See 
Appendix 4).  AFSPA has since been lifted from Tripura in 2015 
(Das 2018).   
AFSPA was intended to tamp down rebellion and crush 
the separatist movements in the Northeast.  However, it has 
become a tool of state abuse, oppression, and discrimination.  
AFSPA enables the military to engage in basically any practice it 
deems necessary within “disturbed areas” which includes, but is 
not limited to, arrests without warrants, shoot-to-kill, and 
destruction of property.  Under AFSPA, military personnel 
responsible for serious crimes are protected under the law, 
creating a sense of impunity for members of the military.  The 
Indian government has tried to justify AFSPA as a necessity in 
order for the military to effectively combat insurgencies.  The 
Indian Supreme Court has also issued guidelines regarding 
AFSPA to prevent human rights violations, but these are 
regularly ignored by the military (Human Rights Watch 2008).  
Regardless, AFSPA has facilitated many abuses including 
torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, and mysterious 
disappearances 
Within India, I will be examining four terrorist 
organizations including Communist Party of India – Maoist 
(CPI-Maoist), All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), Jaish-e-
Muhammad (JeM), and the National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland Isak Muviah (NSCN-IM). 
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 
The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) was founded on 
July 11, 1990 by a group of Tripura nationalists under the 
leadership of Ranjit Debbarma (SATP).  The ATTF was founded 
with the goal of expelling all foreigners who entered Tripura 
after 1956 and, through an armed struggle, establishing Tripura 
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as an independent nation (Tripathi 2018, PTI 2018).  Tripura, 
where the ATTF is most active, is a region in the eastern part of 
India that shares the majority of its border with Bangladesh 
(Tripathi 2018) (See Appendix 4).  The ATTF was first banned 
in 1997 but was banned again under the Unlawful Activities 
Prevention Act in 2018 for five more years (PTI 2018).  The 
ATTF has engaged in the killing of civilians and security 
personnel, extortion of funds from merchants in Tripura, 
supporting and training to engage in terrorist activity, and 
kidnappings (PTI 2018, Tripathi 2018).    
 Shortly after its founding in 1990, the Indian 
government launched a massive campaign to eliminate ATTF 
terrorists in 1991 (South Asia Terrorism Portal).  This campaign 
took place prior to the first documented attack by the ATTF.  On 
October 7, 1992, the ATTF launched its first documented attack 
which targeted police on patrol (Global Terrorism Database).  It 
was an armed assault using a shogun and machete where four 
were killed (Global Terrorism Database). 
 The people of Tripura are subject to discrimination, 
though there is little evidence they have been subject to full on 
repression by the government.  Some instances of discrimination 
include economic disadvantages, lack of proportional 
representation within government, and land shortages 
(Minorities at Risk 2006).  Yet the Tripuri are still able to engage 
in economic activity, have government representation, and live 
on their ancestral land.  This does not indicate intense 
government repression.  AFSPA has also been invoked within 
Tripura for many years, giving the military almost free reign 
over the region.  In 2015, AFSPA was lifted in Tripura after 18 
years of rule (BBC News 2015).  The Indian government cited 
the reason for lifting AFSPA was the insurgency threat had been 
contained (BBC News 2015). However, the ATTF has since 
launched attacks after the lifting of AFSPA.   
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National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) 
 The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) 
was founded in the 1960’s with the goal of gaining independence 
for the people of Nagaland (Global Security).  The National 
Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) was 
formed in the 1980’s as a splinter group of the original NSCN.  
NSCN-IM predominantly operates in Nagaland, a territory in the 
northeast part of India carved out of Assam in 1963 (Minorities 
at Risk 2006).  The Naga people ruled themselves independently 
until British colonial rule and were later absorbed into the Indian 
Union.  Like the Tripuri, many Naga people have not migrated to 
other regions of India and remain fairly isolated; however there 
has been an increase in migration from outside groups to the 
region that are predominantly Bengali (minorities at Risk 2006).  
Nagaland is one of India’s only two Christian majority states, 
creating a significant religious difference from the rest of the 
Indian population, which is predominantly Hindu (Minorities at 
Risk 2006).  
 The Naga independence movement dates back to the 
1940’s, with the formation of the Naga National Council.  In 
1956, the Naga Central Government was formed to help unite 
and advocate on behalf of the Naga people.  A few years later, 
the Indian government declared the Naga Central Government 
illegal and tried to crush the movement through military force.  
In 1962, Nagaland was established but the separatist movement 
continued.  The Indian government persuaded some insurgents 
belonging to the Naga National Council to sign the Shillong 
Accord in 1975, which called for the peace and surrender of 
arms by the Naga militants.  This did not sit well with Muivah 
and Isak, who broke off and created the National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah.  They rejected the Shillong 
Accord and continued to fight against the government.  NSCN-
IM gathered even more strength when in January of 1993, it was 
admitted as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
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Organization (UNPO) with its headquarters at the Hague in the 
Netherlands.  In 1997, the Indian government negotiated a 
ceasefire with NSCN-IM and violence has decreased.  In 2005, 
the ceasefire was extended despite the conflict and terrorist 
activity obviously continuing to occur (Khan 2006, 431-432). 
 On August 25, 2001, the NSCN-IM launched its first 
documented solo attack.  This involved a grenade explosion on a 
truck in Kuligaon village in the Assam state of India.  The state 
of Assam borders the state of Nagaland (See Appendix 4).  This 
attack is classified as a bombing or explosion and targeted 
private citizens and property.  Four were killed (Global 
Terrorism Database). 
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) 
Jaish-e-Muhammad is an extremist Islamic group that 
seeks to undermine Indian control of the province of Jammu and 
Kashmir, unite it with Pakistan, and institute Sharia Law 
(Mapping Militant Organizations). JeM receives significant 
monetary support as well as refuge from the Pakistani 
government (Mapping Militant Organizations).  JeM was 
founded in 2000 by Massod Azhar upon his release from prison 
(Mapping Militant Organizations).  Azhar had ties with Al 
Qaeda, the Mujahedeen, and Somlian insurgencies as well as 
many others (Mapping Militant Organizations).  JeM was 
banned in 2001 (Mapping Militant Organizaitons).  Many of 
JeM’s members come from the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, a 
preexisting terrorist group operating in India and Pakistan, as 
well as Afghanistan (Rabasa et. al. 2006, 83). 
  Jammu & Kashmir, where JeM is predominantly active, 
is the only Muslim majority region in India (Minorities at Risk 
2006) (See Appendix 4).  This area has been subject to many 
land disputes between India and Pakistan, including the attempt 
of Pakistan to essentially annex the region and absorb it into its 
territory.  Jammu & Kashmir is where the majority of fighting 
between India and Pakistan occurs and the territory has been 
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under the umbrella of AFSPA since 1990.  This has caused 
human rights abuses and repression in the area to increase, 
particularly extrajudicial killings (Ganguly 2018).  This has led 
to many movements to repeal AFSPA and replace it with a law 
that upholds human rights while also maintaining security 
(Ganguly 2018).  Understandably, the military has opposed this 
since AFSPA guarantees immunity from prosecution for military 
officials engaging in otherwise unlawful conduct (Ganguly 
2018).   
 The Muslim population in India has been subject to a 
history of discrimination.  In 2000, widespread protests broke 
out after Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, proposed a 
law that would require state approval prior to the construction of 
religious structures (Minorities at Risk 2006).  This law directly 
targeted the Muslim minority, since the government officials 
who would be approving the religious buildings were almost 
entirely Hindu.  Throughout India, the Muslim population is 
economically disadvantaged, underrepresented in government, 
and has limited decision-making power in government on both 
the federal and regional levels (Minorities at Risk 2006).  This 
general discrimination does not amount to repression, since 
Muslims can still participate in economic activity, political life, 
and can practice their religion. 
 On April 19, 2000, JeM carried out its first documented 
act of terrorism in which a suicide car bomber exploded his 
vehicle outside the Indian Army Corp’s headquarters in Badami 
Bagh (Global Terrorism Database).  Four army personnel, three 
civilians, and the bomber were killed in the attack (Global 
Terrorism Database).  This was the first suicide attack in the 
history of the Kahsmir conflict and gained JeM significant 
notoriety (Mapping Militant Organizations).   
Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) 
 The Communist Party of India – Maoist was formed in 
September of 2004 (Global Security).  This organization has 
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roots dating back to 1920, when the first Communist Party of 
India (CPI) was formed with Soviet influence to support 
communist revolution in India (Roy 2017).   In 1967, an uprising 
occurred in Naxalbari during a violent protest of peasants against 
a landlord who demanded heavy interest from them (Roy 2017).  
This protest was quickly quelled, but the term Naxalites, after the 
location of the incident, has since been used to refer to 
communist organizations.  In 1975, the People’s War Group was 
founded and became active in Andhra Pradesh (Aljazeera 2017).  
The Maoist Communist Center was also founded around this 
time and began to hold meetings in Bihar (Aljazeera 2017).  The 
PWG and MCC were the most organized, best armed, and largest 
communist organizations in the country (Roy 2017).  Despite 
their differences, the two groups merged in 2004 and created the 
Communist Party of India – Maoist (Roy 2017).   
 The CPI – Maoist aims to spark a peasant communist 
revolution and capture state power through people’s war 
(Aljazeera 2017).  The group’s ideology is based on Marxist, 
Leninist, and Maoist principles of communism.  The exact 
number of members is unknown but estimated to be around 
8,000 – 10,000 people (Aljazeera 2017).  CPI-Maoist operates 
predominantly in the areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, where 
they are able to hide from the government in the mountainous 
and remote terrain (Aljazeera 2017).  In the last fifty years, the 
Maoist conflict has claimed at least 40,000 lives (BBC 2018).  
CPI-Maoist is considered a terrorist organization by the Indian 
government and is a banned group.  
 CPI-M launched its first documented attack on April 28, 
2005.  It was an assassination attempt on police superintendent 
Mahesh Chandra Laddha that took place in a mine.  Following 
the explosion, the perpetrators fired at police in a shooting battle.  
One person was killed, and nine others injured.  The police 
superintendent survived (Global Terrorism Database).   
 Throughout the duration of the Naxalite conflict, both 
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sides have engaged in serious human rights violations.  CPI-M 
has been linked to the targeted killings of police, political 
figures, and journalists (Human Rights Watch 2016).  State 
security forces, usually police and military personnel, have 
arbitrarily arrested, detained, and tortured villagers (Human 
Rights Watch 2016).  Both sides have used children in armed 
operations during the conflict (Human Rights Watch 2008).  The 
government has sought to justify their actions by identifying 
their victims as Maoist or Maoist supporters (Human Rights 
Watch 2016).  The Indian government has also brought 
politically motivated terrorism charges against Maoist supporters 
(Human Rights Watch 2013).  This has been considered a misuse 
of terrorism laws to target political opponents, tribal groups, 
religious and ethnic minorities, and those who have a history of 
lower caste standing (Human Rights Watch 2013).  Indian courts 
have repeatedly ruled that ideological sympathy cannot be 
interpreted as membership in a banned organization (Human 
Rights Watch 2013).   
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 The cases of India and Burma present some interesting 
insights as to why certain groups may choose to pursue terrorist 
tactics as a method to achieve their goals.  In this study, neither 
of my hypotheses were fully supported.  Some cases in Burma 
indicated past repression may have resulted in terrorism, 
however this was not present at all in India.  The only 
organization that had sufficient evidence of government 
repression within my definition was the case of the Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).  The Rohingya as a group 
are denied the most basic right of citizenship, despite the 
Rakhine state being their ancestral land.  They are not considered 
citizens and are unable to participate in any elements of political 
life that are granted to other ethnic groups within Burma.  This is 
a concrete example of government repression against a particular 
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group of people, creating a potential preexisting condition for 
terrorism.    
 While the majority of the case organizations suffered 
general discrimination, there was not strong enough evidence to 
support the claim that intentional, government instituted 
repression led to terrorist activity.  Often times, the repression 
seemed to increase after the first terrorist attack.  There was little 
evidence, except in the case of ARSA, to support repression 
prior to the first attack.  This indicates that repression is not a 
necessary, preexisting condition for terrorism to occur. 
 Capacity also seemed to have little effect on the decision 
of organizations to engage in terrorist activity.  In fact, it 
appeared to have the opposite effect of what I expected to see in 
both countries.  In Burma, the military indicated a significant 
amount of capacity as it was able to engage in sweeping 
campaigns, demanding a large amount of manpower, funding, 
and artillery.  Weak governments and militaries with little 
capacity would not be able to carry out such endeavors.  The 
Indian government also demonstrated significant capacity, as it 
was able to carry out counterterrorism campaigns in remote areas 
like Tripura and Nagaland, which are over 2,300 kilometers from 
its capital.  This is a very far distance to travel, making it harder 
and more expensive to move military personnel, gear, weapons, 
and supplies.   
 One case that did indicate terrorists may consider 
capacity in their decision making was the Shan State Army – 
South.  In recent months, with the Burmese military being 
preoccupied with the unrest in the Rakhine state and Rohingya 
crisis, conflict has intensified in the Shan State.  In 2018, new 
clashes have broken out in the Shan State.  Earlier in the year, 
the clashes were between the insurgency groups, including SSA-
S and the government (Thu 2018).  Now, the fighting is between 
the various insurgency groups in the Shan State (Thus 2018).  
This decision to ramp up the fighting at the same time the 
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military was preoccupied with the Rohingya crisis, indicates that 
the capacity of the state was considered a factor at some point.  
However, this does not explain the initial choice by the SSA-S to 
engage in terrorist activity. 
 Since neither of my hypotheses were supported, there are 
some factors that may have impacted my findings.  The first is 
that almost all groups are long-lasting or splintered off of 
previous terrorist organizations.  Rather than deciding to engage 
in terrorism with no history of previous violence, most of these 
groups indicated that they had made the decision to engage in 
terrorist activity long ago.  Therefore, some of the terrorism I 
was studying was merely a continuation of violence, rather than 
beginning to engage in violence with no prior history.  In Burma, 
most of the terrorism was linked to guerilla war and insurgency.  
Some groups, like ARSA, have launched attacks on military and 
police prior to their first documented terrorist attack as a part of 
their insurgent war.  The same goes for the Karen, who have 
been fighting a civil war since 1947.  My findings may have 
been altered if I had only examined terrorist organizations who 
did had no history of violence, rather than those who indicated a 
history of past conflict.  
 Another factor that may have influenced the results of 
this study is freedom of information.  Certain events, like 
protests and government discrimination, may not become 
national news until they are particularly egregious.  This may 
have influenced the information I was able to access through 
media sources, since some things may not have been reported on.  
By using a previously authoritarian country like Burma, there is 
also the barrier of freedom of information and press.  I may not 
have been able to access the full extent of the issues occurring 
within the country and repression undertaken by the government.  
This may have impacted my findings as well. 
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Conclusion 
 Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon affecting many 
countries, particularly those classified as weak and failing states.  
As can be concluded from this case study, repression and 
government capacity do not explain two root causes and 
necessary condition of terrorism.  Government instigated 
repression was not present in all my cases, yet the decision to 
engage in terrorist activity was still made.  Capacity also does 
not appear to have much relationship to this decision, since both 
India and Burma demonstrated relatively powerful military and 
police capacity, yet terrorism still occurred.  
 Understanding what causes terrorism is an important 
factor to aid in the creation of counterterrorism policy.  Once we 
know what causes terrorism, we can work to eliminate those 
facts and eradicate terrorism more broadly.  By focusing on the 
factors behind terrorism, rather than the terrorism itself, it can 
help us better shape counterterrorism police to be more effective 
and less strenuous.  
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